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1. Introduction
Forest multifunctionality refers to the valuation of both wood and non-wood forest services.
Non-wood forest services are essentially environmental services such as bio-diversity,
watershed protection, landscapes, carbon sequestration, or social services such as recreation.
Strongly determined by natural forest attributes, forest multifunctionality is increasingly
valued in consumers’ preferences (Mill et al., 2007). However, most of the non-wood
services are not valued in the market, although they could contribute to forest owners’
benefits (Katila & Puustjarvi, 2004). Besides the private forest owner’s capacity to respond to
the increasing demand for non-wood services, the difficulty in quantifying the benefits coming
from amultifunctional management puts in question the effective payments determining their
participation (Engel et al., 2008).
In the literature, forest multifunctionality is generally modeled as a joint production
process (Bowes & Krutilla, 1989; Gregory, 1955; OECD, 2001). Multifunctionality also raises
the question of optimal timber rotation when considering non-wood services (Hartman, 1976).
When adding a spatial dimension, forest multifunctionality may be analyzed at the larger
scale of a forested landscape including more than one forest area. The question of spatial
allocation of multifunctionality is crucial in the literature and at a political level (Andersson
et al., 2005; Boscolo & Vincent, 2003). For instance, in a New forestry approach, Franklin (1989)
suggests implementing multifunctionality in each forest area, as it is already experimented
in tropical forest management. This conclusion turned out to be the core issue in the debate
between Old Forestry and New Forestry in the United States, inducing theoretical developments
on land use through multifunctionality in every forest area versus specialization (Helfand &
Whitney, 1994; Vincent & Binkley, 1993; 1994). Empirical analyses of forest management have
confirmed that there are situations where specialization may be the optimal management
regime (Andersson et al., 2005; Boscolo & Vincent, 2003). Swallow et al. (1997) shows
that accounting for spatial interaction due to ecological interactions also may prescribe a
management which recommends specialization over space.
Added to spatial considerations, time also has an impact on forestry decisions. In particular,
the irreversibility of forest management schemes condition the available strategies and future
benefits. Natural resources management in a dynamic context can be analyzed by the
quasi-option value approach (Arrow & Fischer, 1974; Henry, 1974). This approach takes
into account the characteristics of irreversibility and uncertainty of the sequential decision
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process. Quasi-option value is the value of information conditional on remaining flexible
enough to use this information. Indeed, it represents the difference between the value of an
optionwhen considering that information is forthcoming (closed-loop rationality) and the value
of this option without considering that information is forthcoming (open-loop rationality).
Quasi-option value has been used in a forestry context to choose between strategies of
preservation and development (Albers et al., 1996 a; Albers, 1996 b; Bosetti et al., 2004), to
derive optimal harvest strategies (Jacobsen & Thorsen, 2003; Malchow-Møller et al., 2004)
and forest stand regeneration policies (Jacobsen, 2007). Albers (1996 b) considers a multi-plot
setting, focusing on the spatial interdependence and adjacency among forest plots. Our model
relates to this literature in the measure that our framework uses irreversibility, uncertainty,
and closed-loop rationality in a dynamic decision process. We also consider multiple forest
areas setting, but these areas can be non-adjacent, which allows us to assume they can be
subject to different environmental policies. Furthermore, our approach is characterized by
the choice between two alternatives which represent two exclusive real options (Abildtrup &
Strange, 1999; Geltner et al., 1996; Malchow-Møller & Thorsen, 2003). That is, both alternatives
are associated with uncertain future pay-offs and the possibility to adapt future management
according to forthcoming information. However, we are not estimating the optimal stopping
rule, as in the above mentioned studies, but define the optimal strategy at a given decision
point accounting for future information and the possibility to adapt management according
to this information. The aim of our paper is to shed light on the reflections about the arbitrage
between different strategies in the multifunctional forest management of multiple forest
areas. By multifunctional, we mean a management ensuring both economic function (timber
commercialization) and ecological function (biodiversity, water quality or other amenities)
of the forest. Basically, we consider the two strategies, also analyzed by Vincent & Binkley
(1994) : 1) multifunctionality in every forest area and 2) specialization of forest areas such
that the forest area as a whole is multifunctional. However, we focus on identifying the
optimal management strategy in a dynamic setting with uncertainty about future demand
for forest services and where the different management strategies may have different degrees
of irreversibility. We formulate a simple model which is used to derive general decision
rules which can be applied in a given situation defined by the production function and
uncertainty about future changes in policy. Such changes could be explained by new
biological information or changes in the climate or in the preferences for different uses of
the forest.
The starting point is the following : we consider a forest owner/manager of two forest
areas. We suppose that this manager is constrained by society to implement a multifunctional
management of their total forest area. An immediate problem arises about the best option
for the manager in order to maintain multifunctionality for their total forest area. Indeed, a
first option consists of specializing one forest area through a Clear-cutting management while
the other forest area is specialized for full Preservation of the ecological function, without
any timber harvesting. The other option is to implement a mix of the previous strategies
in each forest areas (Mixed regime in all the forest areas) where timber is harvested but part
of the ecological value is preserved. This two forest areas framework is the simplest one to
embed the problem of the arbitrage between the two alternatives for multifucntional forest
management (mixed or specialized). For the general and more realistic multiple forest areas
case, one can think of our two alternatives as : 1) all forest areas managed under mixed
regime versus 2) a proportion close to 50% of clear-cut areas while the rest is preserved (for
the specialization option).
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The choice between a mixed regime and specialization is a fundamental decision problem for
many forest managers. For example, in France the government encourages forest owners to
increase their harvest of timber because it is considered that forests are exploited less than
socially optimal1. This concerns, among others, forests in mountain regions. If timber should
be harvested in hitherto unexploited mountain forests the manager will have to choose an
exploitation strategy subject to the imperative protection functions of mountain forests. The
relevant alternatives may include : 1) selective harvesting in all forests (mixed regime in all
forests) and 2) clear cutting of some forests and letting other forest areas under protection
(specialization). However, the forest manager will also have to account for future changes in
the demand for the different uses of the forests. The demand may change due to changes in
preferences of the population or climate change may imply that the relative value of different
functions changes, and these changes in demand may be site specific. Our model considers
how uncertainty and irreversibility influence this decision problem.
A first key issue that conditions the choice of forest management in each forest area is the
relationships of irreversibility among management regimes. Clear-cutting a forest area is more
irreversible than implementing Mixed regime, which is more irreversible than full Preservation.
A second key issue is the uncertainty about the future environmental policy, coming from
society and defined for each forest area, when the initial forest management decisions for
each forest area take place.
In order to examine the implications of irreversibility and uncertainty in managing
multifunctionality, we propose a simple framework where there are only two forest areas in
a two-period decision process with two initial choices for multifunctionality (specialization
and mixed regime in both forest areas). In the first period the manager makes management
choices for each forest area, taking into account the economic and ecological values of the
management regimes, the irreversibility relationships among regimes and the priors on the
information to come from society about the environmental policies affecting each forest
area. In the second period, the information is revealed and the manager chooses again
a management regime for each forest area, being constrained by the choices made in the
first period. The time elapse between the two periods is supposed to be long enough to
have an uncertainty about the forthcoming environmental policy but short enough for the
irreversibility relationships to be relevant (no regeneration of the forest).
Our objective is to compare these two management options and determine the conditions
for choosing one or the other. Due to the difficulty of applying a standardized valuation
method for multifunctional management, our method consists of building a model around
assumptions describing the “worst” (reasonable) case for the option of mixed regime in all
forest areas. In this way we obtain a benchmark scenario where this option is favored as little
as possible, in order to determine the conditions for choosing it, within the corresponding
set of restrictive assumptions. The idea is that if the mixed regime option is optimal within
conditions in the worst case scenario, then, in reality, this option must be even more suitable.
In order to do so, we intentionally make the following assumptions :
(i) Although society is supposed to target multifunctionality, we assume that once the
information on the environmental policy is revealed, it can only be a Preservation or a
Clear-cutting policy. In this case, multifunctionality is achieved by society thanks to a mix
of specialization incentives.
1 See the Grenelle Environment Round Table, www.legrenelle-environnement.fr
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(ii) The mixed regime is modeled as an intermediate management regime, whose value is
always inferior to the management that perfectly matches the environmental policy. More
precisely, from an economic point of view, the mixed regime is supposed to have less value
than the clear-cutting regime but more value than the preservation regime. In a similar way,
from an ecological point of view, the mixed regime is supposed to have more value than the
clear-cutting regime and less value than the preservation regime.
(iii) Finally, we work in a risk neutral environment. In this case, there is no difference in terms
of expected value between betting on a perfect match with the environmental policy through
specialization (thus taking the risk of mismatch), and ensuring an intermediate benefit in any
case via a mixed regime in all forest areas.
Relaxing any of the restrictive assumptions above would favor the initial choice of mixed
regime in all forest areas since the corresponding conditions for choosing this initial option
would be less restrictive. Indeed, if we relax assumptions we see that :
(i’) Considering that society could call for a mixed regime in a particular area would be
anticipated by the manager and favor the initial choice of mixed regime in all forest areas.
There are cases where society may call for a mixed regime (van Rensburg et al., 2002).
(ii’) Considering that the mixed regime has a greater value than the specialization regimes
would trivially make the choice of mixed regime optimal in every management period. In
real life, in some particular cases, the mixed regime may have a greater economic or ecological
value than the extreme management regimes. Biodiversity can be greater when encouraged
by an appropriated mixed management than in total preservation. For instance, some
bird species such as the red-cockaded woodpecker requires low density older trees that are
maintained today with active forest management. In a region where such bird species would
be in danger of extinction, this would add ecological value to the mixed regime compared to
a full preservation. Another example is that recreation might have more value in a forest that
is managed in a sustainable way than in a preserved one that could be more difficult to visit.
(iii’) The interest of choosing mixed regime in all forest areas would be greater in a risk
aversion framework, since this option ensures the best adaptability to the forthcoming
environmental policy. Let us consider, as it can be the case in reality, that the forest owner
is risk averse. We have modeled the mixed regime so that it has the same expected value
than betting on one the two extreme values of preservation and clear-cutting (see (ii)), but
mixed regime still represents a less risky initial choice. For instance if a specialization choice
in period 1 for the two forest areas happened to be opposite to what society calls for at period 2
(complete mismatch of initial choice and society’s preferences), then the forest owner would
get the worst possible payoff. This worst payoff would never be obtained when choosing a
mixed regime in period 1 (although the best possible payoff would not be reachable either,
since the only way to obtain it is to bet on a specialization strategy in period 1 that result
in a perfect match in period 2 with society’s preferences). A risk averse forest owner would
take this into account and choose the less risky initial option of mixed strategy, sacrificing the
perfect match payoff, but avoiding the mismatch payoff.
In the benchmark scenario resulting from (i), (ii) and (iii), we thus eliminate from the mixed
regime all the advantages that are not directly related to the irreversibility among regimes and
the adaptability to the second period information about the adopted environmental policy.
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2. The model
We consider two forest areas (area 1 and area 2) that are identical ex-ante. As we will see they
may differ ex-post in terms of environmental policies. For each forest area, there exist three
management regimes P, M and C. Regime P (Preservation) is assumed to guarantee a greater
ecological value of the forest (greater biodiversity, for instance). To simplify, we assume that
in this regime the forest remains un-cut. Regime C (Clear-cutting) leads to greater monetary
incomes through intensive timber commercialization. We assume clear-cutting management.
We choose extreme scenarios for the management regimes P and C as this is sufficient to
generate the stylized facts we wish to bring to the fore. Between these two extreme regimes,
M corresponds to an intermediate management regime to which we will refer to as Mixed
regime. Regime M ensures both ecological and economic functions of the forest. It is assumed
to be ecologically less good than P and economically less good than C, but it is ecologically
better than C and economically better than P, since only part of the timber is harvested.
Irreversibility. Because trees have a long production period, there exists a natural relationship
of irreversibility among the management regimes. This irreversibility is described in
Assumption A1: P → M → C, which means that P can lead to any of the three regimes
and M can only lead to M or C, while C is a dead-end.
In other words, clear-cutting is the completely irreversible option, while preservation is
the more flexible one. M is modeled as an intermediate regime that has an intermediate
flexibility. These irreversibility relationships are linked to an underlying assumption about the
considered time frame. For given forest manager’s time horizon and forest regeneration cycle
there exists always a time frame in which these relationships apply. We restrict our analysis
to this time frame because our model focuses on irreversibility issues. It is evident that over
this time frame our irreversibility relationships may no longer be valid since, for instance, a
clear-cut forest area can grow and even become a preserved forest area. In short, the time
frame between periods 1 and 2 is long enough for the information revealed at period 2 to
be uncertain at period 1, but too short for the forest to have time to regenerate (irreversibility
among regimes play a role).
Options for multifunctionality. We assume that the manager targets a multifunctional
management of the forest as a whole (area 1 plus area 2) and that the questions of the
forest owner’s incentives to participate in a multifunctional management are solved. Such
multifunctionality can only be implemented in two ways. First, the manager can adopt a
specialization strategy in which one area is preserved and the other is clear-cut. Without
loss of generality, we can assume in this case that area 1 is preserved, so that this option is
denoted PC. Second, the manager can choose a mixed regime in both forest areas (denoted
MM). In short, only options PC and MM are considered. Both regimes are multifunctional as
they maintain both ecological and economic characteristics of the forest as a whole. Our goal
is to compare these two management options and to determine the conditions for choosing
one or the other. To solve this arbitrage, it is necessary to observe the consequence of the
irreversibility relationships (Assumption A1) on the 2 forest areas. More precisely, option PC
at t = 0 can lead to 3 regimes at t = 1 : PC, MC, CC. Option MM can lead to 4 regimes at
t = 1 : MM, MC, CM, CC.
Information about environmental policy. We consider a two-period management framework. As
mentioned before, at t = 0 the manager chooses a strategy in {PC, MM}. We assume that
at t = 0 there is no information on whether it is beneficial to preserve the forest areas or if
they have no great ecological value and it is better to clear-cut. We assume that at t = 1
267reversibility and Uncertai ty in ultifu ctional Forest Management Allocation
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society reveals information I ∈ {P,C} × {P,C} concerning the environmental policy (P or
C) that is suitable for each forest area. More precisely, the information that is revealed at
t = 1 can be written I = (i1, i2) with i1 and i2 in {P,C}. At society’s level, we assume that a
multifunctional management of the forest is targeted. Indeed, nowadays most forest countries
have taken consciousness that it is not suitable to only consider forests as a source of timber,
nor to renounce on timber commercialization by integrally preserving the whole forest area.
Because there are many forest areas, multifunctionality can be achieved at a country level
with some forest areas being preserved for their ecological value and others being used for
timber harvesting, depending on the knowledge about the presence or absence of ecological
interest of each particular forest region. We suppose that when having enough information on
the ecological value of a particular forest region, society gives a signal to the corresponding
private forest managers by revealing which management is suitable in this region. This results
in a combination of environmental policies (information I = P or I = C). If, for instance,
preservation is targeted, society may set taxes for the clear-cut forests areas and subsidies
for the protected forests areas inside the region. This environmental policy would change
the economic values of the management options in managers’ eyes. Forest managers have to
choose their individual strategies in the forest areas they manage, depending on their priors
about these environmental policies (forthcoming information).
The assumption according to which information I belongs to {P,C} × {P,C} means that
we assume that society, even though targeting multifunctionality at an aggregated level,
never calls for M as a suitable management in a given forest area. As a result, M is
modeled as an intermediate regime between P and C, and not as an optimal regime (see
Assumption A2). Allowing the environmental policy to be M would favor the initial choice
MM. Given the information at t = 1, the manager chooses a newmanagement strategy under
constraints of irreversibility. Interestingly, the two-areas framework embeds two different
kinds of flexibility. One is linked to the irreversibility relationships among regimes : C is
more irreversible than M which is more irreversible than P. The other corresponds to an
adaptability to the environmental policies revealed at t = 1. This adaptability comes from the
fact that when starting from option MM the manager can choose the more profitable regime
between MC or CM, given the revealed information. There is no such adaptability if PC is
chosen at t = 0, because the clear-cutting implemented in area 2 is irreversible. The interest
of considering a two-areas framework resides in the arbitrage between these two kinds of
flexibility.
Manager’s priors. We assume that the manager is risk neutral. Let vt(X) be the payment
corresponding to regime X ∈ {P, M,C} × {P, M,C} at time t ∈ {0, 1}. At time t = 0,
v0(X) is deterministic and known by the manager whereas v1(X) is a random variable,
which distribution is assumed to be known and corresponding to the manager’s priors on the
forthcoming information on the environmental policy. The priors at t = 0 on this information
I ∈ {P,C} × {P,C} are described by the probabilities µI , verifying µPP + µPC + µCP + µCC =
1. At time t = 1, the value v1(X) is revealed to the manager since the environmental policy is
then known for each forest area. To put aside the impact of the payments of the first period,
we assume v0(PC) = v0(MM). Therefore we can normalize these initial values to zero and
simplify the notation at t = 1, v1(X) = v(X). This assumption is consistent with the fact that
the manager wonders about the best alternative between PC and MM, because giving them
different initial values would favor one or the other of these alternatives. In this way we only
focus on the flexibility of the options and the value of the information revealed at t = 1.
268 Global Perspectives on Sustainable Forest Management
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By only considering the available options at t = 1 (given the irreversibility
relationships), we can denote by vI(X) the benefit from implementing a management X ∈
{PC, MM, MC,CM,CC} on the forest areas under information I ∈ {P,C} × {P,C}. This
2-areas benefit is simply defined as the sum of the benefits of the two forest areas. More
precisely, for forest area k (with k ∈ {1, 2}) we denote by vik (xk) the value associated
with implementing a management xk ∈ {P, M,C} under information ik ∈ {P,C}, then for
X = (x1, x2) and I = (i1, i2), we have vI(X) = vi1 (x1) + vi2 (x2).
Hierarchy among regimes. The values of the 2-areas management regimes in each information
configuration are assumed to be known, and all the uncertainty is concentrated on the fact
that the manager does not know at t = 0 the information configuration at t = 1. We assume
there is a hierarchy among the management regimes under the information i, in terms of
value : Assumption A2 : If the manager is informed about a preservation environmental
policy (i = P) for a particular forest area, then, whatever the management of the other area is,
vP(P) > vP(M) > vP(C). On the contrary, if (i = C), then vC(C) > vC(M) > vC(P).
This very intuitive assumption just means that it is suitable to choose the management regime
that matches the revealed information about the environmental policy. This hierarchy is
justified economically by the fact that an ex-post perfect match to the environmental policy
can lead to subsidies and a mismatch to environmental taxes. Of course, the irreversibility
constraints might not always allow a perfect adaptation of the regime to the policy. Also note
that mixed regime M never gives the best value, whatever the information is.
Assumption A2 has an immediate consequence on the 2-areas regime valuation given
information I ∈ {P,C} × {P,C}. Given the first period decisions (PC or MM) and the
irreversibility relationships determining the available regimes at t = 1, the optimal 2-areas
regime choices are obtained thanks to :
max
X
[vI(X)] = max
x1
[vi1 (x1)] +maxx2
[vi2 (x2)]
As a result, if regime PC is chosen at t = 0, the optimal regime at t = 1 depending on the
revealed information I is :
PC if I = PP
PC if I = PC
CC if I = CP
CC if I = CC
If regime MM is chosen at t = 0, the optimal regime at t = 1 is :
MM if I = PP
MC if I = PC
CM if I = CP
CC if I = CC
The optimal decision exists and is unique for both alternatives PC or MM. Note that regime
MC which is available starting from PC is never chosen at t = 1. The decision tree depicted in
figure 1 takes into account the irreversibility relationships and summarizes the optimal regime
choices depending on the information revealed.
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Fig. 1. Regime decisions depending on environmental policies
3. Result
We have seen that if the information is known, the manager can choose the best option at
t = 1. However, when the initial decision takes place at t = 0, information I is not available.
We must compare options PC and MM at t = 0 in terms of expected value. We assume that
the manager uses the following rationality :
Vˆ(PC) = E[max{v(PC), v(MC), v(CC)}]
and
Vˆ(MM) = E[max{v(MM), v(MC), v(CM), v(CC)}]
where Vˆ gives the expected value at t = 0 of the initial decision in a closed-loop information
structure2, i.e. by taking into account that information is forthcoming at t = 1. Given the
optimal strategies at t = 1 we can write the expressions of the expected values at t = 0 for
each option :
Vˆ(PC) = µPPv
PP(PC) + µPCv
PC(PC) + µCPv
CP(CC) + µCCv
CC(CC)
and
Vˆ(MM) = µPPv
PP(MM) + µPCv
PC(MC) + µCPv
CP(CM) + µCCv
CC(CC)
By using vI(X) = vi1 (x1) + vi2 (x2), we finally obtain condition C :
Vˆ(PC)  Vˆ(MM)
⇔
2 The closed-loop information structure differs from the open-loop one, in which the agent does not
consider that the information is forthcoming. In an open-loop information structure, we would have for
the option PC that V∗(PC) = max{E[v(PC)], E[v(MC)], E[v(CC)]}. The quasi-option value corresponds
to the difference Vˆ −V∗, see Arrow & Fischer (1974); Henry (1974).
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(µPP + µPC)[v
P(P)− vP(M)]  (µPP + µCP)[v
P(M)− vP(C)]
3.1 Analysis of the results
Let us analyze the choice condition of the previous section. Condition C determining the
initial choice of PC or MM depends on the relative value of regime M under I = P, and on
the priors of the manager on the information to come.
Concerning the relative value of M, we know (Assumption A2) that under information I = P,
vP(P) > vP(M) > vP(C). Condition C shows that a value of M close to the value of C
(respectively P) weights in favor of choosing PC (respectively MM) at t = 0, but that this is not
sufficient to determine this choice because of the impact of the probabilities of occurrence of
the environmental policies. The impact of the relative value of M is only avoided for vP(M) =
(vP(P) + vP(C))/2 = v˜M. In this case, [vP(P)− vP(M)] = [vP(M)− vP(C)] and condition C
becomes :
Vˆ(PC)  Vˆ(MM)⇔ µPC  µCP
Concerning the impact of the priors, let us first deal with some extreme cases. If µCC = 1, then
µPP = µPC = µCP = 0, and condition C shows that the manager is indifferent between MM
and PC. Indeed, if information CC is certain, management CC is always possible at t = 1, no
matter what the initial choice is. Interesting cases are those for which µCC < 1.
If we now consider that the manager has no idea of the forest area that is more likely to be
subject to one or the other environmental policy at t = 1, that is to say if µPC = µCP, we then
remark that the probabilities do not play anymore in the arbitrage, but only the relative value
of M does, since condition C becomes :
Vˆ(PC)  Vˆ(MM)⇔ vP(M)  v˜M
This is in particular the case when the forest areas are adjacent in terms of location. It is
rational to think that such forest areas will be subject to the same environmental policy, so
that µPC = µCP = 0.
In the light of these extreme cases, we can rewrite condition C by introducing the center of the
interval of possible values of vP(M) :
v˜M =
vP(P) + vP(C)
2
and the ratio γ of probabilities characterizing the asymmetry between priors :
γ =
µPP + µPC
µPP + µCP
We have that :
Vˆ(PC)  Vˆ(MM)
⇔
γ[vP(P)− vP(M)]  [vP(M)− vP(C)]
⇔
(γ+ 1)vP(M)  γvP(P) + vP(C)
⇔
271reversibility and Uncertai ty in ultifu ctional Forest Management Allocation
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vP(M)  v˜M −
vP(P) + vP(C)
2
+
γvP(P) + vP(C)
γ+ 1
And we finally obtain a new expression for condition C :
Vˆ(PC)  Vˆ(MM)
⇔
vP(M)  v∗M = v˜M +
γ− 1
2(γ+ 1)
[vP(P)− vP(C)]
If µPC = µCP, then γ = 1 and the threshold over which mixed regime in both forest areas
is preferred over specialization is v˜M. This means that half of the range of values (from the
lowest vP(C) to the highest vP(P)) leads to the choice of the mixed regime in both forest
areas. Over the threshold the expected value of regime M (coming from timber harvesting and
the subvention rewarding the environmental quality of this regime) is big enough to make
it attractive to choose this regime for both forest areas at t = 0. Under the threshold, it is
specialization the is optimal at t = 0.
However if the priors are not symmetric anymore, say if µPC > µCP, then γ > 1 and the
threshold v∗M is greater than v˜M. The interval of values of M that is favorable to specialization
is increased in a proportion (γ− 1)/2(γ+ 1) of the length of the interval of the possible values
of M under information P, i.e. [vP(P)− vP(C)]. This can be interpreted as the added value of
the information about which area is more likely to be subject to one or the other environmental
policy. For example for a system of priors such that µPP = µCC = 0 and µPC = 2µCP = 2/3,
then γ = 2 and (γ − 1)/2(γ + 1) = 1/6. In this case 1/2 + 1/6 = 2/3 of the interval of
possible values of M lead to choosing specialization at t = 0.
Conversely, if µPC < µCP then γ < 1 and (γ− 1)/2(γ+ 1) < 0. This time the range of values
of M that is favorable to specialization decreases (v∗M < v˜M). However, this situation can only
occur in a situation in which the manager has asymmetric priors but cannot adapt, because of
technical constraints, the first period specialization strategy in order to match these priors. In
this case, although information I = CP is more probable than I = PC, the available strategies
at t = 0 are only PC and MM. This of course favors option MM since choosing PC could
lead to a mismatch with the environmental policies at t = 1. If there is no such technical
constraints, having priors such that µPC < µCP should rather lead to compare CP and MM
at t = 0. The arbitrage is then solved like in the case where PC and MM are compared by
renaming forest area 1 into forest area 2 and vice versa, and we find again that v∗M > v˜M, that is
to say a situation that is more favorable to specialization than the symmetric case µPC = µCP.
4. Concluding remarks
We have considered that when a manager of two forest areas targets a multifunctional
use of the forest in the context of irreversibility among regimes and uncertainty about the
forthcoming information on environmental policy affecting the forest areas, two alternatives
must be compared : Specialization of the areas and implementation of Mixed regime in both
forest areas. Added to the flexibility of management regimes, considering 2 areas gives rise to
another kind of flexibility : the better adaptability to forthcoming information.
Our model shows that the choice of mixed regime in both forest areas depends upon the
relative expected value of a forest area in a mixed regime compared to a preserved one : mixed
regime should not adversely affect the ecological value of the forest too much. More precisely,
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the value of a mixed regime should be at least greater than the average value of preservation
and clear-cutting regimes for a forest area that is subject to a preservation environmental
policy. In the case where the manager has priors on which forest area is more likely to be
subject to one or the other environmental policy, this favors the choice of specialization if we
consider that the manager can choose the management matching these priors. The interval of
expected values of the mixed regime that ensures the choice of mixed regime in both forest
areas in the first period is therefore reduced. We give an expression of the resulting variation
of the threshold in function of the priors of the manager. This variation can be interpreted as
the added value of the information about the asymmetry in the probabilities of occurrence of
the environmental policies for each forest area.
Let us underline that the range of expected values of the mixed regime that is favorable
to implementing mixed regime in all forest areas has been obtained within a framework
designed in order to not favor the mixed regime (worst case framework). This was aimed at
finding theminimal conditions of emergence of such forest management (see assumptions i, ii,
and iii in the introduction). Relaxing any of these assumptions in our framework would favor
the choice of mixed regime in both forest areas over specialization. Our model, thus, provides
minimal requirements for the mixed regime to be an attractive solution for owners/managers,
which could be helpful to have in mind when setting minimal subventions levels.
Even though the model is theoretical it provides relatively simple decision rules which
applies to a range of empirical problems. The choice between clear cutting and selective
harvest strategies in hitherto un-managed forest areas is one example of a decision where the
presented framework applies. However, it applies more generally to choice situations where
increased intensity of land use may have an irreversible impact on the supply of ecological
services and where there is uncertainty about the future location-specific demand for these
services. Determining whether Specialization or Mixed regime will be the optimal strategy will,
of course, depend on an assessment of the joint production function of the different ecosystem
services, i.e. assessing to which degree there are synergies or conflicts in joint production of
the considered services or goods.
In the present paper we considered the choice of a private forest owner facing uncertainty
about future forest policy (e.g. payments for ecological services). The model applies also to
situations with state forests where the forest managers are constrained by the population’s
current demand for ecosystem services but also consider the uncertainty about the future
demand for ecosystem services.
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